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Abstract
In 2019, nine US states voted on drastic policy changes to restrict access to abortion. Did
the American population react to these policy changes, and if so how? Theory suggests
that if the public disagrees with the policy changes, public opinion moves in the opposite
direction of the policies. This is referred to as the Thermostat theory. Public opinion is
commonly measured with public opinion polls, but these polls are not always available
or used. Instead people use other channels of information, for example social media. On
social media platforms people are not asked on their opinion but provide it voluntarily.
This means that people can mobilise and express themselves differently. The study uses
Twitter to answer three research questions. The first is whether the American public
reacted to the policy changes. The second is if sentiment on Twitter changed. The third
is if a sentiment change was a shift in public opinion or a change of expression. The
analysis find that people reacted to the policy changes and that sentiment on Twitter
increased for a short period. The results indicate that the sentiment change was a result
of new people joining the debate who has a more liberal view on abortion. The results
show that the Thermostat theory is not at play but instead there is a mobilisation of
opinions. If this change of expression is mistaken for a shift in public opinion, politicians
risk working for further policy changes of which the public disapproves.
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1 Introduction
On the 15th of May in 2019, the state of Alabama voted on a policy change which would
make abortion practically illegal. Not even in the case of rape or incest would abortion
be permitted, making the policy stricter than they were in Ceaus,escu Romania in the
1980’s. Although Alabama can be considered an extreme case, it was not the only state
that voted on policy changes to restrict access to abortion that year. Several other US
states also decided to restrict abortion during the spring and summer of 2019. This trend
does not only go against the increasingly liberal attitude towards abortion around the
world, but it also goes against Roe v. Wade. Roe v. Wade is a legal case after which it
was decided that US states are not allowed to deny a woman abortion before viability.
These abortion policy changes are extraordinary and if implemented they will change
the life of many. With such drastic changes in society, citizens are likely to react. The
starting point for this study is therefore to ask whether the American public reacted to
these drastic policy changes or not.
Whenever a society is faced with a significant change in policy, the public is expected
to react. In fact, a democratic country is quite dependant on the reaction of its people
because it tells policy makers how to best represent the public. Hence, public reaction to
policy is important for a democracy, but people do not react to every policy that is voted
on. Theory suggests that people only react when they disagree with the policy change.
If the policy change is not to their liking they express this. In situations when people are
specifically asked what they think about a certain policy, it is easy to determine the true
public opinion. There are however many times when people express their opinion without
being asked, for example on social media. Such channels of information are often used
by both citizens and policy makers to gain an understanding of what people think. Are
these sources of information, where people can express themselves at will, representative
to the general public opinion?
When using social media to investigate public reaction to policy change, theory states
that one additional aspect which must be taken into consideration. When people can
express themselves at will they have the capability to mobilise. A mobilisation of people
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can potentially change the opinion on whatever platforms that is being used. This change
is then only a result of more people of the same opinion joining the debate. The change
can then appear as a shift in public opinion, but do not necessarily represent the average
public opinion in society.
Hence, this study will investigate public reaction to abortion policy changes using a forum
where people are allowed to express themselves at will. The forum that will be used is the
micro-blogging site Twitter. Public reaction theory states that public opinion changes if
the people disagree with the policy changes. Theory also states that when people can
share their opinion freely there is the possibility of a mobilisation. A mobilisation can
make it appear as if public opinion has shifted, when it is in fact a change of how people
express themselves.
As of today, no study exists which investigates public reaction to policy using a forum
where people can express themselves voluntarily, that additionally considers the mobili-
sation effect. Previous research has failed to lift public reaction research from a stylised
scenario and instead apply it to a real world situation.
What the study finds is that US citizens did react to the abortion policy changes on
Twitter and that public opinion became more positive to liberal abortion views around
the same time. This positive public opinion however, was found to be the result of an
inflow of new people who all had a more liberal opinion on abortion. Therefore it can be
concluded that there is no shift in opinion but rather a change of expression. Although
the study can not fully explain who the people that mobilised were, the results present
important insight into how public opinion appears in information channels were people
share their opinion voluntarily. An individual who observes the debate of abortion on
Twitter at the time of the policy changes are at risk of believing that the public have had
a true change of heart when it is in fact a change in who expresses themselves. If a policy
maker were to act according to how people express themselves on Twitter at the peak of a
discussion, the chance is that they will not act in agreement with the true public opinion.
If the public perceive that policy makers do not listen to the people, this is likely to cause
frustration and undermine the representative democratic system.
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To present how the study came to this conclusion, the remainder of the text is divided
into five larger parts. The first part explains the theory on how public opinion can be
expected to shift as a result of policy changes but, also examines the additional risk of
observing a mobilisation and change of expression. The theory section also discusses the
case of abortion policy changes in the USA during 2019 and finally present three research
questions. The second part discusses the data that is used. It explains advantages and
disadvantages with Twitter data, as well as how the data was collected and processed.
The third part deals with the independent variable, the abortion policy changes in the
USA. The fourth section discusses the results in where the three research questions are
answered with the help of the data and the variables discussed. It additionally tries to
answer who it is that writes on Twitter. The final section concludes what impact the
results can have on society as well as presents suggestions for future research.
2 Theory
This first section will present the theory relevant to investigate public reaction on Twitter
to the abortion policy changes. There are two main aspects to consider. The first aspect
is what people actually think regarding an issue, in other words their true opinion. The
answer to this is found in randomised public opinion polls were people are asked to share
their opinion on different matters. This however is not the only time when people share
their opinions. Citizens also have the possibility to express themselves on all matters at
times when they are not directly asked to. This can for example be during discussions on
TV, in articles in the newspaper or on social media platforms. During a time of a policy
change, new people can decide to express their opinion. This change of who expresses
themselves can appear as if public opinion has shifted. The first part of this theory sec-
tion will consider these two scenarios and the mechanisms behind what causes a shift in
opinion versus what creates a change of expression.
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2.1 Shift in public opinion
This section will consider the mechanisms behind a true shift in public opinion as a re-
sult of a policy change. When a policy is changed in society, citizens can react and this
reaction is measured with a change in public opinion (Diamanti, 2011). Public reaction
to policy changes is essential for a representative democracy. By reacting to policy, cit-
izens can hold their elected politicians responsible for their politics in between elections
(Soroka and Wlezien, 2010; Page and Shapiro, 1983). When a politician decides on a
policy change, they might not always know beforehand whether this policy is desired or
not by the people. Hence, the reaction of citizens to this policy will indicate to politicians
whether or not they should work towards more policies of a similar nature. Their decision
can at a later stage impact their chances of being reelected (Bendz, 2015).
In order for people to react they must be reasonably well-informed about the policy
changes and what they entail (Wlezien, 1995; Baumgartner and Jones, 2002). If they are
not aware of the policy changes, they cannot react to them (Williams and Schoonvelde,
2018; Cochran and Chamlin, 2005). Even if information is available, the public might
still not respond. According to theory, people are assumed to act reasonably and award
politicians for making good decisions and punish them otherwise. It might be unreason-
able to expect such a response from the public. Studies indicating that people are in
fact quite uninterested in politics and policies (Achen and Bartels, 2017). Additionally,
voters have been found to blame the government for things over which it has no control,
for example the weather (Achen and Bartels, 2016, 2017). Hence, theory assumes that
people are reasonable but in reality they potentially lack both interest and commitment
to make informed choices.
If it is assumed that people react to policy changes in a reasonable fashion, what is then
to be expected regarding a public opinion shift after a policy change? Although there
are many potential explanations for the mechanisms behind the process, the predominant
theory is the Thermostat theory.
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2.1.1 The Thermostat Theory
The Thermostat theory regards the public as a collective of individuals who’s policy pref-
erences are distributed along a dimension. The public’s collective opinion is then the
median of this dimension. The median represents the ”ideal” situation on a specific issue
and policies should correspond to this ideal (Wlezien, 1995). If policies which differ from
the ideal public opinion are introduced, then the public will react.
Much like a thermostat self-corrects to maintain a certain temperature, society self-
corrects when the public reacts to policy changes. If a policy is introduced that suggests
more changes than what the median citizen wants, the public will send a signal to policy
makers stating its disapproval. Politicians who notice disapproval in society will stop
enforcing new policies in the same way that a thermostat shuts off when the temperature
in the room is above the preferred settings. The signal that the citizens send to the policy
makers is a change in public opinion.
Take for example military spending. If the current military spending is less than the ideal
spending according to the public, people will ask for more military spending. If a policy is
introduced which then allowed for more military spending, the demand for more military
spending will reduce. Hence, fewer people will ask for more spending. If the policy would
allow for more military spending than what the public deems as ideal, the reaction would
change and more people would instead argue for less military spending (Wlezien, 1995).
The process then resembles that of a thermostat. A signal in policy change creates a
reaction in the public opinion. When this opinion has been heard by policy makers, the
signal stops (Wlezien, 1995).
The Thermostat theory explains the importance of public reaction in relation to policy
change.(Bendz, 2015; Soroka and Wlezien, 2005, 2010; Wlezien, 2004, 1995). The mecha-
nisms behind the theory suggest that public opinion functions as a self-correcting process
of which public opinion serves as a counter balance to potential changes. By this, the
public can maintain some level of control over politicians and policymakers. The counter
balance allows for stability which is essential in a society. (Baumgartner and Jones, 2002).
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The procedure additionally hinders changes to occur too quickly (Baumgartner and Jones,
2002). Considering how the public always strive for the median or ideal opinion, it is dif-
ficult for policymakers to introduce policies which would offer a substantial change to
society.
2.2 Change of expression
This second section will discuss the mechanisms behind a change in how people express
their opinion. What is important to note is that if people have a genuine change of mind
and public opinion changes, then people will additionally change the way they express
themselves. What this section considers is the case when people express themselves dif-
ferently, even if there is no true change of opinion.
Situations when this is likely to occur is when people who have not previously taken part
in the discussion become active or when people start expressing their opinion more force-
fully. Why would people all of the sudden become more active in a debate? Certain events
can create an increased interest regarding the specific topic being discussed. When inter-
est in a topic increases, the dimension of the issue can change. Any type of issue always
has several dimensions. However, it is quite common in the public debate that one specific
dimension dominates at a given time (Baumgartner and Jones, 2002). Take the exam-
ple of nuclear power (Baumgartner and Jones, 2002). When it was first introduced the
public image was overwhelmingly positive. However, as time passed the world observed
what consequences a nuclear power plant accident can have on both people and the envi-
ronment. These events changed the debate completely which became almost exclusively
negative. The multiple dimensions to the issue always existed but were never discussed si-
multaneously in a balanced manner. Instead, only one dimension was presented at a time.
The reason why the interest for a topic is expected to increase is usually the result of an
extraordinary event. An extraordinary event can be the extreme case of a nuclear power
plant accident, but it can also be a drastic policy change. When such an extraordinary
event takes place, new actors who’s opinions correspond with the rising dimension will
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become involved in the public debate. As these new actors gain more influence over the
topic, it inspires even more actors to get involved. The more actors who get involved, the
stronger the new dimension will take hold (Baumgartner and Jones, 2002). This inflow of
people that joins the debate due to the reaction of the extraordinary event, can be termed
as the mobilisation effect.
2.2.1 Mobilisation
A social mobilisation is a situation where people put their own individual benefits aside
to profit the collective group (Rogers, Goldstein and Fox, 2018). Social movements can
take on many forms, but they are all defined by four crucial aspects. The first aspect
is a collective challenge. A collective challenge is a contentious issue where a group of
people disagrees with the view held by another group in society. The collective challenge
is usually the core element of a mobilisation used to recruit new members. It can also be
one of the few things the movement can use to their advantage. When lacking in other
resources, the possibility to interrupt and question the actions of the opposing group cre-
ates a disturbance which gives the mobilisation some influence over the situation (Tarrow,
2011).
The second aspect that is required is that people have a common purpose to mobilise.
Hence, disagreement with another group in society is not enough to create a social move-
ment. There must also be some overlapping interests. If for example a group in society
opposes governmental influence of banks they have a collective challenge. If however one
part of the group thinks the solution is that banks should be privatised, whereas the
other part of the group wants to introduce crypto currencies, they do not have a common
purpose and it will be difficult to mobilise people. Hence, there needs to be a common
goal of how to face the collective challenge. The clearer the goal, the easier it is for people
to find a common purpose. Therefore, people are more likely to mobilise around issues
which are heavily polarised. A polarised issue is more likely to form two sides and create
a sense of ”we” and ”them” (Tarrow, 2011).
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This leads to the third aspect, which is solidarity. If the sense of ”we” is strong, it is easier
to find solidarity within the group. Solidarity between people is not necessarily constant.
People can feel a temporary solidarity with others and when the challenge the group is
facing has passed the solidarity can vanish. The fourth and final aspect required for a
mobilisation is a continuous interaction with the opposing group, hence the action of the
mobilisation (Tarrow, 2011). If there is no interaction the mobilisation is unlikely to see
any results and reach their goal. The interaction can be in the form of debates, protests
or verbal and written communication.
2.3 Abortion policies in the USA
The policy change this study will investigate is the heavily restrict right to abortion in the
USA. In 2019, a total of nine American states passed bills to restrict the right to abortion.
Five of the nine states have passed bills which are referred to as ”fetal heartbeat bans”
or ”the-six-week-abortion-ban” (Glenza, 2019). The five states in question are Georgia,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi and Ohio (Lai, 2019). Utah and Arkansas limited the
abortion until week 18 of pregnancy and Missouri until the 8th week. The harshest bill
was passed in Alabama which introduced a complete ban on abortion in almost all cir-
cumstances, including rape and incest. The only time abortion is permissible is when the
mother’s life is in great danger and nothing else can be done to save her, or if the fetus is
carrying a deadly affliction.
These policy changes serve as a good case for this study. First of all, they are current and
therefore the results of this study are relevant in order to predict future policy efforts in
the US. Second of all, the policy changes are considered drastic and extraordinary. The
more drastic and extraordinary the policy changes are, the more likely it is that the public
will be informed about the changes and react to them.
The reason why the policy changes are considered drastic and extraordinary is because
they all go against the so called Roe v. Wade. Roe v. Wade is a landmark case when
it comes to abortion in the USA. In 1973 a woman in Texas (who used the pseudonym
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Jane Roe) wanted an abortion, but was not permitted one because at the time abortion
in Texas was only legal if the mothers health was in danger. The lawyers of this woman
filed a case and it was eventually taken to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
decided that it was unconstitutional for states to restrict access to abortion before the
third trimester of pregnancy. They referred to the Fourth Amendment and the ”Right
to Privacy”, which they claimed protected women’s right to chose to have an abortion
during the early weeks of pregnancy.
This means that all the policy changes made in the nine different states go against the
rulings of Roe v. Wade. These nine states were fully aware that the stricter abortion
policies would most likely be challenged in court. Still they decided to vote in favor of
them. One of the main goals with these policies was not only to bring about actual change
regarding abortion, but also to provoke a national debate and ultimately revoke Roe v.
Wade (Chute, 2019; Lai, 2019; Kendall, 2019).
The debate on abortion in the US has commonly been divided into two distinct camps.
The first is the the pro-choice side which advocates for legal abortion. The other is the
pro-life side which argues for the fact that a fetus is a human being and hence abortion
is equivalent to murder (Marquis, 1989). Despite these two very distinct camps, public
opinion on abortion is not as polarized as might be expected and has remained relatively
stable over the years. The majority of the US citizens is of the opinion that abortion
should be legal only under certain circumstances. The other two groups who thinks it
should always be either legal or illegal are around 20% (Caspani, 2019; Pew Research
Center, 2019; Gallup, 2019a). There are three historical cases which would be deemed
similar to the current situation and are relevant to take a closer look at.
The first is the ruling of Roe v. Wade in 1973. Unfortunately, public opinion polls only
started to ask questions on abortion in 1975. Therefore, there is no easily accessible data
to investigate how the public responded to this case. The other two situations however
took place after 1975. These two are the Planned Parenthood v. Casey case from 1992
and the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act from 2003, both represented in graph 1. In the
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the strict trimester rule was abandoned and instead states
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were not allowed to ban abortions before viability of the fetus. The Partial Birth Abor-
tion Ban Act does not deal with restriction or right to abortion in total, but rather about
a specific abortion method. It was however, the first ban to be enforced after Roe v. Wade.
Graph 1: Public opinion on abortion in the USA (Gallup, 2019a)
Year
Looking at the time around Planned Parenthood v. Casey case in graph 1 it becomes clear
that the number of people who thought abortion should be legal under any circumstances
increased the months before the case. Proportionately, the number of people who though
abortion should be illegal at all times decreased and reached its lowest a few months
before the case was brought up in the Supreme Court. As the amount of people who
thought abortions should always be illegal reached an all time low, the number of people
who though abortion should always be legal reached an all time high. Public opinion
remained at this level for almost a year after the case had closed. Although the opinion
did not change indefinitely, the case does appear to have had a impact on public opinion
on abortion that stretches over a significant time period.
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Considering the number of people who were of the opinion that abortion should be illegal
at all times, a drastic drop can be observed a few months before the case was brought up
in the Supreme Court. However, after this initial drop the number of people who thinks
abortion should be illegal starts to increase again. This increase reaches its top just before
the case is discussed in the Supreme Court and thereafter starts to slowly decrease again.
This sudden increase followed by a slower decrease can potentially be the result of mo-
bilisation. People who are of the opinion that abortion should be illegal mobilise before
the case has been decided on. As the outcome of the case became clear, this mobilisa-
tion stops and the number of people who thinks abortion should be illegal decreases again.
During the time of the Partial Birth Abortion Ban, no change in public opinion can be
observed. This indicates that the public might not react at all to policy changes, even if
they are made on a national level. These two cases do not offer any consistent view as
what public reaction to expect in light of the current policy changes. Rather they show
that policy changes can cause public opinion to shift, people to mobilise and that people
might not react at all.
The historical cases and the Partial Birth Abortion ban share similar features with the
current policy changes. All of them gained national attention and the previous cases
resulted in a policy change on a national level, which is what the current policy changes
are striving for. Therefore, the outcome for these previous situations are interesting in
order to analyze what can be expected for the current situation. However, there are some
significant differences as well. Both Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey can
be directly referred to one specific legal case were the Supreme Court issued their ruling.
The Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act was a governmental decision, but this ban was also
the result of legal cases, for example Stenberg v. Carhart or Gonzales v. Carhart. The
current situation is not a legal case which eventually can turn into a national policy or
law. Instead, several state policies are pushing for national change. There is reason to
believe that citizens will react differently to drastic state policies compared to court cases.
Policies at state level are much closer to the citizens and therefore they are more likely to
react to the changes.
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2.4 Theoretical expectation
This section will combine the presented theory of public opinion change and mobilisation
with the case of abortion policy changes in the USA. To investigate public reaction, the
study will use data from the social media site Twitter. This is a platform were users can
chose to express their opinion. Using Twitter enables this study to investigate whether
any change in public opinion is in fact a true public opinion shift or a change in public
expression. In order to investigate public reaction on Twitter, three research questions
will be considered.
The first is whether or not people reacted to the policy changes that took place. This ques-
tion is essential to the study. It cannot be assumed that the public did react despite the
fact that there was information available. The policy changes gained both national and
international media coverage (Associated Press in Montgomery, 2019; Gagliardo-Silver,
2019; BBC News, 2019; Svenska Dagbladet, 2019; Le Monde, 2019; Chute, 2019; Lai, 2019;
Kendall, 2019). Despite information being available, theory states that people might be
unresponsive and uninterested (Achen and Bartels, 2017).
Question 1: Did the citizens of the US react to the abortion policy changes on Twitter?
Only if the answer to the first question is that people did in fact react to the policy
changes, does the second question become relevant. Even if a reaction is observed, it does
not necessarily mean that the sentiment regarding abortion changes. However, the second
question needs to be asked and answered before posing the final question.
Question 2: Did the average sentiment on Twitter among the US population change as a
result of the policy changes?
If the average sentiment has changed as a result of the policy changes the third and final
question can be posed. Is the sentiment change a result of a shift in public opinion or
a change of expression? For a true change in public opinion, the relevant theory to use
is the Thermostat theory. As mentioned, the Thermostat theory states that the public
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wants policies to correspond to the median opinion of the people. When new policies are
presented the public will react accordingly. Applying this to the case of abortion poli-
cies in the USA, there has been no visible change in public opinion before these policies
were enforced. This would then indicate that the policies are more drastic than what the
median public opinion ideal is. This in turn means that the expected response from the
public is that more people express their support for more liberal abortion policies. Hence,
reviewing public opinion after the policies have been enforced compared to before would
show a more positive view on liberal abortion. In other words, the opinion is expected to
go in the opposite direction of the policies.
However, a sentiment change does not necessarily needs to be a result of a shift in pub-
lic opinion. It could also be the result of a mobilisation. Considering the four aspects
required for a mobilisation to occur, the situation of abortion policies in the USA fulfills
all of these aspects. The abortion policies themselves pose a collective challenge and the
strive to stop them serve as a common purpose. People are additionally likely to find a
common purpose due to the heavily polarised debate regarding abortion in the USA with
the pro-life vs. pro-choice. The third aspect of solidarity is present among the pro-choice
supporters. This is because pregnancy unites women since many can relate to a situa-
tion of an unwanted pregnancy and imagine the consequences of it. Lastly, interaction
between the opposing groups of pro-life versus pro-choice has been present for some time.
The interaction has taken place in debates and on online forums. If the suggested poli-
cies serve as a collective challenge that mobilise people the opinion is expected to go in
the opposite direction of the policies. Unlike the Thermostat theory however, when the
policies have been voted on the collective challenge disappears which would put an end to
the mobilisation. The opinion would then be expected to return to the level it had before
the mobilisation started.
Question 3: Is an observed sentiment change on Twitter a result of a shift in opinion or
change of expression?
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3 Data
This study will investigate public reaction to policy changes using a medium where people
can express their opinion as they see fit. The traditional data used when investigating
public reaction to policy is public opinion polls. Because public opinion polls ask a ran-
dom sample from the population about their opinion, such a poll is capable of capturing a
true shift in public opinion. If public opinion polls were the only outlet where people ex-
pressed their opinion, the true opinion of the public would always be known, disregarding
any flaws in survey methodology. However, people do not only share their opinion when
asked to. They can voluntarily express their opinions on a daily basis. Who expresses
themselves and when is not random since people have different types of incentives to speak
for or against certain topics at different times. Hence, the main difference then between
scientific polls and social media is that in public opinion polls people are asked on their
opinion. On social media platforms no one is asked to share their opinion but people do
anyways.
Public opinion polls are scientific polls and most commonly used by researchers or pol-
icy makers. Normal citizens do not always have easy access to these polls and they can
additionally be complicated to understand. Instead, people use everyday channels of infor-
mation to gain understanding of public’s reaction to policy. Such a channel is for example
social media platforms. Even scientists, politicians and policy makers have increasingly
started to use social media to investigate public opinion. Because of this, the current
study will use a more realistic output to answer the question of whether the American
public reacted to the abortion policy changes. If they did react, the study will also con-
sider whether or not the reaction was a true public opinion shift or a change of expression.
3.1 Twitter data
In order to investigate the most realistic output of public reaction to policy this study
will use data from Twitter. On Twitter, users can share their opinion as they see fit.
Therefore it serves as a good option because if a reaction to the abortion policy changes
is observed, it is possible to determine whether the reaction is an opinion change or a
14
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mobilisation.
Studies have shown that all though Twitter data is not a representative sample of the pop-
ulation, sentiments displayed on Twitter correlates with behaviour and actions of people
and provide similar results as a traditional public opinion poll (Cody et al., 2016; Akcora
et al., 2010; O’Connor et al., 2010). Therefore, Twitter can be used to measure a shift in
public opinion (O’Connor et al., 2010; Barbera´, 2016). These findings are a big advantage
for public opinion research since Twitter data enables the possibility to collect information
on a day to day basis. This is unlike public opinion polls which usually takes weeks or
even months to collect and lacks the possibility of observing the daily development. At
best, large scale public opinion polls can provide data on a monthly basis but more often
on a yearly (McCormick et al., 2017).
The possibility to observe public opinion change on a daily basis additionally enables the
possibility to investigate a mobilisation of opinion. This in combination with the fact that
people who use Twitter do so voluntarily and can write multiple tweets a day. Hence, it
is not a random selection of people from the population.
Although this study benefits from the fact that Twitter does not display a random selec-
tion of people, it is important to acknowledge that the selection bias can be a disadvantage.
Some people are more likely to be active on Twitter compared to others. Over 60% of
all users on Twitter are men and 80% are so called affluent millennials, which are people
born between 1981 and 1997 and have at least $100 000 in assets excluding real estate.
Additionally, the demographic data available for each user is extremely limited. This pre-
vents additional analysis between groups and the ability to control for known sample bias
which exist on Twitter (Cody et al., 2016). Consequently, Twitter users does not make
up a representative sample of the US population since for example the older generation,
people with a low income and certain nationalities are underrepresented.
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3.2 Data collection
The only demographic data that can be collected on the users on Twitter is the geo-
graphical location from where the tweet was sent. With this information it is possible to
collect data from specific locations. The data set used in this study is a collected sample
of data from each state in the US resulting in a data set with over 32 000 observations.
The reason as to why each state has been sampled instead of collecting it on a national
level is so that comparisons can be made between the states. The fact that tweets can be
collected by state provides an opportunity for additional analysis to be conducted.
3.3 Sentiment
To measure public opinion on Twitter, tweets are categorised according to sentiment.
This can be done with the help of sentiment analysis. A sentiment analysis categorises
tweets and indicate if they are either positive, negative or neutral in their sentiment based
on the words contained within each tweet.
In order to predict the sentiment of each tweet, a random sample of 1 000 tweets were
categorized by hand. They were given a sentiment value of either 1 (indicating a more
liberal view on abortion), 0 (a neutral view) or -1 (indicating a more conservative view on
abortion). This sample was used to train a model which in turn predicted the sentiment
of the remaining tweets. The method used to train the model is called Term Frequency-
Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF). The core idea of this method is that each word is
given a weight. This weight is calculated by looking at the number of times that specific
word appears in a tweet, relative to the number of tweets the word appears in total in
the data set. Words that appear in many tweets are given a weight closer to zero. This
method allows the model to calculate how important a word is in each tweet and thereby
be able to identify important words. The more unique and important words the model
can identify, the easier it is for the model to make a reasonable prediction of the sentiment
behind the tweet. Before the method was applied to the data, all so called stopwords were
removed. Stopwords are for example ”in”, ”are” or ”is”. These words do not contain any
information but occur frequently. By removing the stopwords it is easier for the model
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to distinguish which words that are important. The trained model acquired an accuracy
score of 0.92, meaning that it correctly classified 92% of all the tweets.
3.3.1 Positive
To get a clearer view of what type of tweets are classified into each category, some exam-
ples will be presented. All the examples are tweets which have been categorised by the
model and thereby provides some insight to what types of tweets the model has placed in
the separate categories. As previously mentioned, a sentiment score of 1 indicates a more
liberal view towards abortion. Looking at the different tweets classified as more liberal
towards abortion, the message in the tweets varies.
A number of tweets reference the fact that decreasing access to abortion will most likely
not lead to a decrease in actual abortion rates. These people might want to decrease the
number of abortions occurring, but they clearly state that they do not approve of the way
proposed to getting there and therefore oppose the current policy changes.
Other users disagree with the statement that a fetus should be treated as a child with
rights. What is more important for them is to keep abortion legal and accessible because
many who seek abortion do not have the financial means to care for a child. The case
of Roe v. Wade references the right to privacy for all people and this is also frequently
brought up as an argument against banning abortion. This might also be people who
in principal do not approve of abortions but consider the right to have a choice more
important. Other tweets classified as being more liberal towards abortion claimed that
the debate was about more than just abortion and rather about men’s control over women.
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Positive tweet examples
This is not the way to decrease the number of abortion, which has
actually been very low. Proper sexual education, access to contraception,
and proper sexual and reproductive health care is but women should
still be able to have an abortion if needed. For any reason.
Alabama
10th of May
Yup, people of privilege never consider how abortion bans will
disproportionately affect those of lower socioeconomic status
and women of color. Typical self centered BS.
Washington
17th of October
Glad you mentioned abortion. I also consider freedom a major value.
How free is a woman if she cannot even choose what legal medical
care to obtain? And all because someone else’s religious/moral beliefs
are being forced on her.
Washington
17th of May
Nothing pisses me off more than seeing MEN stand outside planned
parenthood with signs about abortion telling WOMEN what we should
do with our bodied. Lol go get a vasectomy then come talk to me.
Kansas
11th of April
3.3.2 Negative
The tweets categorised as -1 were those that indicated a more conservative view on abor-
tion. Unlike the tweets classified as 1, there is one clear opinion that dominates among
the conservative tweets. This is that a fetus is a human being and therefore abortion is
essentially murder. Amongst the conservative tweets there are many religious references
as well as political. The political references does appear amongst the more liberal tweets
as well, but not as often.
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Negative tweet examples
Subjects like this can’t be discussed at length because of twitter restrictions.
It is inaccurate to state that pro-life individuals are against Medicaid,
food stamps and free lunches. I am not a hater of the impoverished.
As a pro-lifer, I’m against murder. Abortion is murder.
Alabama
19th of May
Abortion is not a right plain and simple, it’s the murder of babies.
If you don’t want a baby then keep youf legs closed.
New Mexico
22th of May
God will condemn America for our liberal stand on abortion..
every child has the right to life
California
18th of June
Democrats want to abort the kids. Abortion is murder .
Arkansas
31st of October
3.3.3 Neutral
A large portion of the tweets are classified as 0, meaning they are neither liberal or con-
servative in their view of abortion. Some of them are people who take part of the debate
but are neutral in their opinion. This can for example be in the form of questions. Others
simply state that, although they acknowledge that a debate is ongoing they do not wish to
participate. Some users on Twitter are dedicated to simply report news and are thereby
a neutral party.
Some tweets include links, pictures or other forms of media. The analysis however cannot
take into consideration these other types of media, but simply the text. Even if the tweet
in its entirety might indicate a clear statement in the abortion debate, if the text is not
clear it might be categorized as neutral. The same applies to tweets which are answers
to other users tweets. There is also a number of tweets which contain the word abortion,
but are irrelevant to the abortion debate.
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Neutral tweet examples
Tell me again, what is your stance on abortion?
Pennsylvania
24th of July
Imma sit out on the abortion talk
North Carolina
18th of December
HF1108 [NEW] Physicians required to allow viewing of ultrasound
imaging prior to abortion. http://bitly.com/XY8J3y.
Minnesota
22th of February
John Legend is an abortion !
New Mexico
30th of October
Since the accuracy score of the model is at 92%, a number of tweets are wrongly classified.
Reviewing the data set, it does not appear that the error is structural and hence it will
not affect the analysis. What is apparent is that a number of tweets which should be
classified as either 1 or -1, have instead been classified as 0. This means that the results
from the analysis might be underestimated.
4 Variables
This section will discuss the two main variables used in the analysis. Since the study
investigates public reaction to policy changes, the abortion policies are expected to have
an impact on public reaction. This means that the dependent variable is public reaction
and the independent variable is the policies on restriction of abortion.
Starting with the dependent variable which is public reaction. Public reaction is observed
with public opinion and in the current analysis public opinion is measured through senti-
ment on Twitter. The analysis will consider if and how the sentiment has changed after
the time when the policies were voted on, compared to before. The change, or lack of
change, will indicate how the public has responded to the policy changes.
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The independent variable is the abortion policy changes. The policy changes made in
the USA during 2019 are presented in table 1, which shows that nine states in total all
made policy changes regarding abortion. It should be noted that other states also made
changes to policies on abortion apart from the nine mentioned. The nine states have been
selected based on two criteria. The first is that they all propose a ban of abortion after a
certain week of pregnancy and this week is before viability. Therefore the states oppose
Roe v. Wade which forbids states from banning access to abortion before viability. An
example of a state which also changed its legislation on abortion but was not included in
this study is North Dakota, where doctors were banned from performing abortions in the
second-trimester using some specific instruments (Al Jazeera, 2019). The policy change
in North Dakota is clearly in line with the other nine policy changes, it is however not as
clearly against Roe v. Wade. The other criteria on which the policies have been selected
is that they have all been voted on within a close proximity with each other. Other states
have discussed or suggested similar measures, but they have not been voted on.
Graph 2 additionally show up to which week it is permitted to get an abortion without
any special permission. Note that the week presented are the weeks which the states are
striving for but not necessarily enforced as of yet. Many states which proposed a restric-
tion of abortion are still to pass these changes legally. Most states permit abortion before
viability and therefore do not have a specific week. However, viability commonly occurs
around the 24th week of pregnancy. The map in graph 2 illustrates that there are very
few states apart from the nine presented in table 1 which oppose Roe v. Wade. Hence, a
majority of the states which have suggested changed abortion policies did so during the
short time period of 2019. Graph 2 also clearly shows that Alabama proposes a unique
policy on abortion being the only state in the USA which wishes to prohibit it altogether.
The variable in the analysis which represent these policies is referred to as After policy
change. The variable is a dummy variable coded with either 0 or 1, where 0 indicates the
time before the policy changes and 1 the time after the policy changes.
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Table 1: States which have passed restrictive laws on abortion in 2019
State Date
Previous
last week
of abortion
New
last week
of abortion
Arkansas March 15 22 18
Kentucky March 15 22 6
Mississippi March 21 20 6
Utah March 25 ∼ 24 18
Ohio April 11 22 6
Georgia May 7 22 6
Alabama May 15 22 0
Missouri May 24 ∼ 24 8
Louisiana May 30 22 6
Graph 2: Last week of permissible abortion without special circumstances
(as proposed by the states)
grey = no time restriction
Alaska: no time restriction Hawaii: 26
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5 Results
Having reviewed the data and discussed the variables that are used for the analysis, this
sections present the answers for the three research questions. The first three parts of the
result section discusses one research question each. There is however a fourth part to this
section. This fourth part considers the additional question of who it is that writes on
Twitter.
5.1 Question 1: Reaction to the abortion policy changes?
This section will aim to answer the first research question, which is if the public reacted to
the policy changes at all. The best way to answer this is by simply looking at the activity
on Twitter. Graph 3 presents the number of tweets that contain the word ”abortion”
that were sent each day during 2019 in the USA.
Graph 3: No. of tweets containing the word abortion
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From January until March the activity is extremely low with only a few tweets sent each
day. In March however, the activity on Twitter regarding abortion takes off. This cor-
relates well with the first state that voted on new policies to restrict access to abortion
which was Arkansas on the 15th of March. The clear peak occurs on the 16th of May
when the number of tweets sent was well over 2 000. This peak coincides with the ban in
Alabama on the 15th of May.
It would then appear as if people are specifically reacting to the ban in Alabama which
can be confirmed when looking at the content of the tweets. 16 % of all tweets sent on
the 15th and 16th of May specifically mention Alabama. Comparing this to the other
eight states which made policy changes, they are only mentioned in between 0 - 2 % of
all tweets at the same time. It then becomes clear that the ban in Alabama really made
people react. This is not surprising considering how the ban in Alabama was by far the
strictest policy change, basically making abortion completely illegal. The more extreme
a change is, the more likely it is that people will react to it.
The last out of the nine states which voted on policy changes regarding abortion was
Louisiana on the 30th of May. Shortly after this time, Twitter activity regarding abortion
decreases and stabilises around 100 tweets per day. Hence, from graph 3 it becomes clear
that the engagement on Twitter regarding abortion is triggered by the abortion policies.
The activity increases drastically around the Alabama ban, but this interest does not last
for more than a day or two. After this time the activity drops to around one hundred
tweets per day. Although the activity is limited from July and onward, it is not completely
eliminated. Hence, the policy changes created a debate that appears to have lasted even
after the last policy was introduced in Louisiana.
Graph 3 answers the question if the public reacted to the policy changes made, and the
answer is clearly yes. The public did react to the policy changes on abortion and espe-
cially to the Alabama abortion ban. Having established that the public did react the
study can continue onward to consider the second research question: Did the average
sentiment change after the policies?
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5.2 Question 2: Sentiment change as a result of the policy
changes?
This section aims to answer the second research question, which is if the average senti-
ment changed after the policies compared to before. If the sentiment did change, theory
suggests two possible scenarios. The first is the Thermostat theory. According to the
Thermostat theory, sentiment should change to become more positive after the policies
compared to before. This would indicate that people become more liberal towards abor-
tion to counterbalance the conservative policies. The second scenario is a mobilisation
effect. If a mobilisation has occurred, again sentiment would be expected to increase
because more people will engage to face their collective challenge of opposing the policy
changes. However, unlike the thermostat theory the sentiment would not be expected to
last any longer period after the policy changes. This is because when the policies have
been voted on, the collective challenge cease to exist and the mobilisation ends. Therefore,
a temporary sentiment change would indicate that a mobilisation has taken place.
Sentiment change is observed by plotting the average sentiment per day over time. The
average sentiment per day is calculated by taking all the tweets which were sent in a
specific day and then taking the average sentiment for all these tweets. For example, if
five tweets were sent on January 1st and they had the sentiments of 0, 0, 1, -1 and 1 the
average sentiment for the 1st of January would be 0.2. The results are presented in graph 4.
In graph 4 it is possible to determine that the average sentiment reaches its highest point
in May. This indicates that the majority of the people who tweeted about abortion in
May had a more liberal view on abortion. The markers in the graph are more opaque on
days when more tweets were sent. The more tweets sent, the more reliable the data can
be considered. The dates where the markers have the lowest opacity is the time between
March until July. This is the time when the most tweets were sent and therefore the pre-
diction is more accurate during this period. January and February has big fluctuation due
to the sparse data, which also means that the markers are extremely transparent to the
point were they are barely visible. When regrading average sentiment per month instead
of day by day the results confirms the trend in graph 4. In January and February the
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Graph 4: Average sentiment per day
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average sentiment per month is around 0. It then increases gradually in March and April
and spikes in May with an average sentiment of 0.4. From May to July the sentiment
again drops to a value just above zero.
Looking at graph 4 it becomes clear that as the policies are introduced the sentiment
increases. This means that the more policies suggesting restriction of access to abortion,
the public opinion on Twitter becomes increasingly more liberal towards abortion. This
would then provide support for the Thermostat theory. If the Thermostat theory is at
play it would mean that the general public in the US do not wish for more policy changes
restricting access to abortion. This in turn could potentially suggest that Roe v. Wade
is unlikely to be overturned and no national policy change will occur. However, looking
at the time period just after the Alabama abortion ban the sentiment drops. Therefore,
when considering the whole picture, graph 4 indicates that although the sentiment ap-
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pears to increase before the Alabama ban and thereafter decrease again, no long term
change has taken place. Instead, sentiment changes only for a short period. This might
indicate that a mobilisation of opinion has occurred.
Graph 4 point towards the fact that something occurs around the time of the Alabama
ban. To determine the details of the change that occurred, a statistical analysis is re-
quired. Therefore, table 2 presents a regression analysis with three models. Considering
the first model, this one tests whether the average sentiment changes from the time period
before the policy changes compared to after. Since the Alabama abortion ban on the 15th
of May appears to be the most influential of all the policy changes, this specific ban serve
as a breaking point. This means that the values in the After policy change variable are
coded as 0 indicating the time from January 1st to just before the Alabama ban, and 1
indicating the time directly after the Alabama ban. To balance the data before and after
the policy changes, the time period after the 15th of May has been reduced and therefore
the regression only considers tweets sent between January until September.
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Table 2: Regression Analysis
Dependent variable: Sentiment on Twitter (-1 - 1)
Model 1
Bivariate
Model 2
Only states with
policy changes
Model 3
Discussion period
After policy change (0 - 1) -0.01 -0.04
Arkansas -0.11*
Georgia 0.11*
Kentucky -0.15
Louisiana 0.02
Mississippi -0.03
Missouri -0.06
Ohio 0.06*
Utah 0.02
Discussion period (0 - 1) 0.26*
Intercept 0.27* 0.28* 0.10*
N 27 617 6 916 27 617
R2 (adjusted) 0.00 0.01 0.03
* Significance level p<0.05
After policy change model 1: 1 = Time after 15th of May
After policy change model 2: 1 = Time after each state’s respective policy change
Discussion period model 3: 1 = Time between May - June
In model 1 the coefficient is -0.01 which means that going from time period 0 (time before
the Alabama ban) to time period 1 (time after the Alabama ban), the sentiment changes
-0.01 units. The intercept in model 1 is 0.27 which means that at time 0, the mean senti-
ment is overall positive and in time period 1 the sentiment is 0.26. Hence, the sentiment
change is extremely small and the change is not significant.
Model 1 includes all tweets from all states and they all have the cutting point at the time
of the Alabama ban. There are however nine states which have made policy changes at
different times. To take this into consideration, model 2 includes only the nine states
which have made policy changes and set the After policy change variable to correspond
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to the date of the policy change in the respective states. Therefore, the value 0 for the
After policy change variable means all tweets sent before the 16 th of May in Alabama,
but in Arkansas it instead means all tweets sent before the 16 th of March.
In model 2, all states are compared against Alabama. This means that the intercept
of 0.28 in the average sentiment in Alabama at time 0. The coefficient of Arkansas is
-0.11 which means that the average sentiment in Arkansas is -0.11 less than the average
sentiment in Alabama. Most importantly however is the After policy change variable.
The coefficient of the After policy change variable decreases to -0.04 compared to -0.01 in
model 1. The effect remains small and statistically insignificant. This means that even
when accounting for the individual policy changes the average sentiment does not change
significantly.
From graph 4 it can be observed that sentiment does change around the time of the policy
changes, but the regression analyses indicates that the change is equal to zero. This is
most likely due to the fact that sentiment rises before the breaking point on the 15th of
May, but afterwards the sentiment declines. The rise and fall of the sentiment cancel
itself out when the regression breaks at the peak. To confirm that sentiment does change
during the time of the policy changes, the independent variable is again changed. In
model 3 the Discussion period variable is coded so that 1 represents the discussion period
from May - June. 0 indicates the remaining months from January until March and July
until September. Model 3 confirms that sentiment is significantly more positive during
this time period with an increased sentiment from 0.10 at time 0, to 0.36 at time 1. These
numbers provide accurate figures to the pattern seen in graph 4.
The results in this section present the following answer to the research question if the aver-
age sentiment changes after the policy changes: There is no significant change of sentiment
after the policy changes compared to before. This remains true also when controlling for
the individual policy changes. With this it can be concluded that the Thermostat theory
is not at play. What is observed however is a temporary sentiment change around the
time of the policy changes. This observation leads to the third research question, which
is whether any sentiment change is a change of opinion or a change in the way people
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express themselves regarding abortion on Twitter. Hence, did people become increasingly
more liberal towards abortion during a short period or is it a mobilisation of opinions?
5.3 Question 3: Shift in opinion or change of expression?
This section investigates whether the change that appear around the time of the policy
changes does in fact mean that people temporally changed their opinion to be more liberal
towards abortion, or if the change is a result of new people entering the debate on Twitter.
5.3.1 User activity
To establish whether public opinion has actually changed or if sentiment changes due to
mobilisation of opinion is more difficult than for example to determine if people have re-
acted to the policy changes. A good place to start is to consider the people who tweet. It
has been established that the activity on Twitter increases drastically around the time of
the Alabama ban. This however does not necessarily mean that new people have entered
the debate. Since every user is permitted to send up to 2 400 tweets per day, the increased
activity could be a result of the same users simply sending more tweets. If this is the case,
the sentiment change is more likely to be a display of a true public opinion change rather
than a mobilisation. Graph 5 shows the number of new users who enters the debate per
day. Every user is only counted once, at the time of the first tweet they send.
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Graph 5: Number of new users per day
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Graph 5 is almost identical to graph 3. There are very few new users from January until
March, but at the time of the first policy change on the 15th of March more people start
tweeting. It clearly spikes around the time of the Alabama abortion ban in May with
almost 1 200 new users tweeting on the 15th of May. This indicates that the increased
activity around the policy changes is not a result of the same people sending more tweets,
but rather new people joining the debate.
To compliment the results in graph 5, graph 6 shows the average number of tweets sent
per person and day. The results in graph 6 further supports the fact that the increased
activity is a result of an inflow of new users, who on average send between 1 - 2 tweets
per person.
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Graph 6: Average number of tweets per person and day
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5.3.2 Individual fixed effects model
One additional approach to investigate whether people have changed their mind regard-
ing abortion or if the change in sentiment is a result of new people joining the debate, is
to look at the people who tweeted more than once. If people who have tweeted several
times start changing their sentiment in their tweets, this would point towards the fact
that people have changed their mind.
The method to investigate sentiment change for only those who tweeted more than once
is with a regression model with fixed effects. With a fixed effects model it is possible
to observe the variation in sentiment compared to the mean sentiment for each person.
People who have only sent one tweet will have no variation around their mean sentiment
and what is then observed is any sentiment change for people who tweeted more than once.
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Table 3 presents three models. The first model shows the difference in sentiment for those
who tweeted more than once after the 15th of May compared to before. As in previous
models the change in sentiment from the time before the Alabama ban to the time after is
very small and also not significant. Model 5 only looks at the nine states that made pol-
icy changes were the 0 signifies the time before the states respective policy change and 1
the time after. The effect is slightly bigger compared to model 4 but remains insignificant.
The third model tests whether the sentiment changes in the period May - June compared
to the rest of the time. The results show that in the time from January until March and
July until September, the average sentiment is 0.22. In May and June the sentiment in-
creases with 0.08 and the change is significant. This means that people who tweeted more
than once writes significantly more positive during the time of the policy changes. This
is contradictory as to what would be expected if the sentiment change is only a result of
more people joining the debate and instead suggest that people do change their opinion
on abortion. Also when conducting an additional analysis which only includes people who
have tweeted before and during the policy changes does the effect remain at the same level.
Although model 6 suggests that people become significantly more positive towards abor-
tion during the time of the policy changes, the change could also be a result of how
people express themselves. People who tweeted before the policy bans can have expressed
themselves in such a way that they have been classified with the sentiment 0. When the
policy bans were under discussion on May and June, these people expressed themselves
more forcefully which then made it easier for the sentiment analysis to categorize them
with a sentiment of 1. Additionally, in the previous model 3 it can be observed that the
sentiment increases with 0.26 during the discussion period. However, since people only on
average express themselves 0.08 units more positively during the same time, the increased
sentiment observed in graph 4 cannot be fully explained by the more positive expression.
Therefore, the significant result in model 6 does not necessarily mean that the overall
public opinion has changed. However, the results in model 6 shows that the sentiment
change that occurred in May and June is partly a result of new people joining the debate
but additionally that people express themselves more positively.
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Table 3: Fixed effects model analysis
Dependent variable: Sentiment on Twitter (-1 - 1)
Model 4
Bivariate
Model 5
Only states with
policy changes
Model 6
Discussion period
After policy change (0 - 1) 0.01 0.04
Discussion period (0 - 1) 0.08*
Intercept 0.26* 0.25* 0.22*
N 27 617 6 916 27 617
R2 within 0.00 0.00 0.00
R2 overall 0.00 0.00 0.03
* Significance level p<0.05
After policy change model 4: 1 = Time after 15th of May
After policy change model 5: 1 = Time after each state’s respective policy change
Discussion period model 6: 1 = Time between May - June
The results presented has established that the increased volume of tweets is in fact a
result of an inflow of new people who all send a few tweets per person. Although this
points towards sentiment change being a result of mobilisation of opinions and not that
public opinion became more liberal towards abortion for a short time, the results cannot
conclusively say that this is the case. All the new people who have joined the debate may
very well have changed their opinion on abortion and the fact that more people write
on Twitter is simply a product of an increased interest. Therefore, further analysis is
required in order to try to answer the question of who it is that writes on Twitter during
this time of policy change.
5.4 Who writes on Twitter
The results presented have answered the three research questions and come to the con-
clusion that the US population did react to the policy changes and even though the
Thermostat theory is not at play, the sentiment changed during the time of the policy
changes. This sentiment change is not a result of a true public opinion shift but rather
new people who previously did not share their opinion decided to join the debate. Hence
the sentiment change is the result of mobilisation. An additional question which then
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arises is: Who are these people? Who are the people who collectively manage to change
the entire Twitter sentiment in just a few days? It could for example be possible that
people in the nine states that voted on abortion policies are more likely to mobilise since
people who are directly affected by a policy have a higher incentive to react. This section
will try to investigate this a bit further.
5.4.1 State by state
In the regression analyses that only include the nine states, the sentiment change for
each of these nine states is presented. In these models it is clear that sentiment seems
to differ depending on the state. In some states sentiment becomes more positive after
their respective policies have been introduced, but in others the sentiment becomes more
negative. Therefore, it is possible that there are differences between states which do not
become apparent when considering all tweets collectively. Since location of the tweets
origin is one of the few demographic features that are known about the users, looking at
state differences is a good place to start to try to get a better picture of who the new
Twitter users are.
In graph 7 and 8, the public opinion on abortion in each state is presented (Pew Research
Center, 2014). Graph 7 shows percentage of people in each state who thinks abortion
should be legal in most or all cases. A darker greens means a higher percentage. Graph 8
shows the percentage of people who thinks abortion should be illegal in most or all cases.
The states where a higher percentage thinks abortion should be illegal are on average the
same states that has proposed new policies restricting access to abortion.
If the sentiment on Twitter is representative to previous public opinion polls, a similar
pattern should appear when considering the percentage of tweets sent from each state
that were coded as positive versus negative. Looking at graph 9 and 11 which shows the
distribution of positive and negative tweets it becomes clear that this is not the case. For
example, Arizona is responsible for a high number of positive tweets but also for a high
number of negative tweets. Overall, the states seem to on average send the same number
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of positive and negative tweets. Hence, states which are more liberal towards abortion
does not send more positive tweets compared to states who are more conservative towards
abortion and vice versa.
Graph 7: % of people who
thinks abortion should be
legal sometimes or always
(Pew Research Center, 2014)
Alaska: 63% Hawaii: 66%
Graph 8: % of people who
thinks abortion should be
illegal sometimes or always
(Pew Research Center, 2014)
Alaska: 34% Hawaii: 29%
Graph 10 and 12 additionally show if the number of tweets sent from each state is pro-
portional to the US population. If the percentage on tweets sent from a state is the same
as the percentage of inhabitants compared to the entire US population, the value would
become 1 which then means perfect representation. A value over 1 mean that the state
is overrepresented in the data and a value under 1 means that it is underrepresented.
Ideally, these maps would therefore be one single color, but it might be expected that the
states that have voted on policy changes are somewhat overrepresented since the people
in these states are directly affected by the policies and therefore have a stronger incentive
to speak their mind. The maps show that a large number of states are overrepresented in
the data but these states are not necessarily the states that have voted on policy changes.
For example, Wyoming and Rhode Island are extremely overrepresented among the posi-
tive tweets. This can partly be explained by the fact that these are two states with small
populations.
These maps considers the entire time period from January until December. What has
been established however is that the people who are responsible for the sentiment change
enter the Twitter debate in May, but then exits again after June. Maybe the representa-
tion looks different during this time period?
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Number of tweets from January - December
Excluding Alaska and Hawaii
Graph 9: % of positive tweets Graph 10: % of positive tweets
in relation to population
Graph 11: %. of negative tweets
Graph 12: % of negative tweets
in relation to population
Zooming in on only the two months May and June there is not much difference compared
to the entire time period. The states which thinks abortion should be legal does not on
average send more positive tweets than the states which thinks abortion should be illegal.
Again many states are overrepresented in the Twitter data set and these are not the states
that have voted on policy changes.
What if only new users in May and June are considered and those who already tweeted
before May are excluded. Where do the new users come from? Graph 17 shows the dis-
tribution of new users in May and June. A high percentage of users came from Georgia
which is one of the states which voted on restricted access to abortion. Apart from that
however there is no clear pattern showing that people in the nine states that voted on pol-
icy changes were more inclined to join the debate in May or June compared to other states.
There is also no clear pattern showing that people from states that think abortion should
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Number of tweets from May - June
Excluding Alaska and Hawaii
Graph 13: % of positive tweets Graph 14: % of positive tweets
in relation to population
Graph 15: % of negative tweets
Graph 16: % of negative tweets
in relation to population
be legal are more inclined to join the debate in May or June compared to states who
thinks abortion should be illegal. Graph 18 additionally shows that when comparing to
the proportion of the US population, the distribution of new users in May and June is
not representative.
New users from May - June
Excluding Alaska and Hawaii
Graph 17: % of new users Graph 18: % of new users
in relation to population
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So far it has become clear that people that come from states that on average think abor-
tion should be legal are not more inclined to tweet positively about abortion compared to
people in states that on average think abortion should be illegal and vice versa. The dis-
tribution of positive and negative tweets remains practically unchanged when considering
only the time period when sentiment changed the most, May and June, compared to the
entire time period from January until December. In May and June a large portion of new
users come from Georgia which is one of the nine states that voted on policy changes.
Because the people in Georgia are directly affected by the policy changes in the state, the
fact that people from Georgia engages more than people from other states seems reason-
able. This pattern is however not visible in any of the other eight states that voted on
policy changes. Considering the number of new users in relation to the population there
is again no clear pattern that can be reasonably explained.
5.4.2 Democrats vs. Republicans
What has not been discussed previously in this study is the correlation between opinion on
abortion and partisanship. People who think abortion should be legal in most or all cases
tend to sympathise with the Democratic party and people who think abortion should be
illegal in most or all cases tend to sympathise with the Republican party (Gallup, 2019b).
Therefore, it can be hypothesised that new users in May and June more often come from
Democratic states.
Looking at graph 19 however, it becomes clear that the average number of new users per
day is approximately the same for democratic and republican states, but slightly more
new users from republican states. As has previously been established the number of new
users increases drastically around the 15th of May. At this peak it appears as if there
are more new users from republican states compared to democratic states. Taking into
consideration that there are more US citizens who come from republican states compared
to democratic. Approximately 43% of the US inhabitants live in democratic states com-
pared to 57% in republican. Graph 20 presents the weighted average number of new users
from democratic and republican states. Even though the difference at the peak around
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the 15th of May evens out slightly, there are still more new users from republican states.
Graph 19 and 20 shows that there are not more new users from democratic states during
the time of the biggest sentiment change on Twitter. Instead there are more users from
republican states. It should be taken into considering that the graphs do not present par-
tisanship, but simply the governing party in the states from which they sent the tweet.
This means that the sentiment change could be a result of people who have a liberal
stance on abortion but live in republican states. This would then mean that the average
sentiment in May and June would be higher for tweets sent from republican states com-
pared to democratic. Graph 21 displays the average sentiment per day from the different
states. At the time of the Alabama abortion ban the sentiment appears to be higher for
people who come from democratic states.
Since there are more new users from republican states but a higher sentiment for users
from democratic states, maybe the sentiment change can be explained by the fact that
people from democratic states send more tweets on average compared to users in republi-
can. Graph 22 however shows that people from all states tweet on average one tweet per
day during the time of the Alabama abortion ban.
In conclusion the data conveys that Twitter users who live in states that have a higher
percentage of people who thinks abortion should be legal does not tend to send more pos-
itive tweet regarding abortion. The same applies for negative tweets on abortion. People
who come from states with a higher percentage who thinks abortion should be illegal,
do not portray a more negative sentiment on Twitter. The distribution of positive and
negative tweets in relation to the US population also does not follow the pattern that
would be expected. For example, states that have not introduced new policies or where
a high percentage of people think abortion should be illegal are overrepresented among
the negative tweets. There is little to no difference in these patterns when looking more
closely to the time period of the sentiment change, May and June. Neither does the inflow
of new users during this period coincide with the expected pattern. What also becomes
clear is that new users are disproportionately distributed across the states in relation to
the US population.
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Democrats vs. Republicans
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Finally, the new users more often come from republican states but the average sentiment
is overall higher for people in democratic states at the time of the Alabama abortion ban.
During this time new users send on average one tweets no matter what state they come
from. All of these findings result in the knowledge that the inflow of new users during the
time of the sentiment change are not representative to the US population. More people
from republican states engage during this time period but at the peak of the sentiment
on the 15th of May, people from democratic states have a higher sentiment. What has
also become clear from these findings is that the question of who writes on Twitter can
not be sufficiently answered with the information available.
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The results presented in this section can be concluded as follows: During the time of the
abortion policy changes there is a mobilisation of people who are more liberal towards
abortion. A substantial amount of new people join the debate and people who were al-
ready on Twitter usually write with a more positive sentiment. Although it is possible
to see which states the new people come from, this information alone has not provided
sufficient insights to determine who the people that mobilise during this period are. Over-
all people who are more liberal towards abortion appear to mobilise from all over the USA.
6 Conclusion
This study set out to investigate whether the American public reacted to the policy
changes that dealt with restricting access to abortion in nine states during 2019. It used
the medium Twitter were people are free to express themselves as they wish. A sentiment
change on Twitter could then be the result of a true shift in public opinion or a change
of expression. Theory states that public reaction to policy changes is crucial for any
democracy. It is a tool that citizens can use in order to hold their elected representatives
accountable for their actions in between elections. As long as the citizens have access to
information regarding the policy changes, they have every opportunity to react to them.
However, studies indicate that despite information being available people can be uninter-
ested and therefore do not react. There is also the risk of people not acting as reasonably
as theory would suggest.
Assuming that people do react reasonably to policy changes, this reaction can either be
a shift in opinion or a change of expression when people can chose to share their opinion
rather than being asked for it. If a shift in opinion has occurred, the most predominant
theory to explain this shift is the Thermostat theory. This theory states that if new
policies are introduced that differ from the public’s perception of an ideal policy, public
opinion will sway in the opposite direction of the newly introduced policies. On Twitter,
there is also the possibility that a change of expression has taken place. A change of
expression is most likely explained by a mobilisation of opinions, with new users entering
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the debate and additionally people expressing themselves more forcefully. The difference
between a public opinion shift and a change of expression is that for a public opinion
shift, people have changed their mind regarding a certain issue. If there is a change of
expression people have simply changed their way of talking or writing about the topic,
but they have not necessarily changed their mind.
To investigate people’s reaction to policy changes, the policy made in the USA during
2019 which restricted access to abortion were used. The abortion policies serve as a good
case study because they are recent, but also drastic. This makes it more likely to observe
a reaction in society. Three questions were posed to investigate if the people reacted to
these policy changes. The first was whether the citizens of the US react to the abortion
policy changes at all. The second if the average sentiment among the US population
change as a result of the policy changes and the third if an observed sentiment change
was a result of a shift in opinion or change of expression.
Since the study set out to examine public reaction the way it appears in a medium were
people can express their opinion even if they have not been asked to, Twitter data was
used. Sentiment on Twitter has been found to correlate with people’s behaviours and
actions and thereby it can be used to study public opinion. Additionally, Twitter is a
platform were people express their opinions voluntarily unlike public opinion polls were
they are specifically asked to. This makes it a good choice to investigate public reaction
in a more realistic setting.
The analysis provided answers to the three research questions. First of all, it can be es-
tablished that the public did react to the policy changes. Secondly, sentiment on Twitter
increased temporarily as a result of the policy changes and especially around the time of
the Alabama abortion ban. Thirdly, the Thermostat theory was rejected because no true
shift in public opinion had occurred. Instead, the sentiment change was a result of a mo-
bilisation of opinions. This mobilisation consisted of a vast amount of new people joining
the debate as well as people expressing themselves significantly more positive during this
time. The results made it clear that a fourth question had to be asked, namely who these
people that mobilised are, or more specifically where they come from. There is no clear
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pattern as to where the new people come from, rather people from all over the country
join in the mobilisation and express their support for more liberal abortion policies.
What do these results tell us? They convey that even though public opinion can ap-
pear to shift on Twitter, people’s true opinion on the matter does not necessarily change.
Considering the fact that there are many people who are passive information seekers, the
perception of a shift in public opinion can potentially become a problem. People who do
not actively look up public opinion polls but still want a perception of what the public
thinks regarding a certain issue, will inevitably turn to different and easily accessible chan-
nels of information. Such a channel is for example Twitter. If they have not previously
followed the debate but enter when the policy changes are taking place, people will get
the perception that the view on abortion is much more liberal than what the true public
opinion actually is. This can become an even bigger problem when considering the fact
that both politicians and policymakers sometimes have to turn to social media to gain an
understanding of what the public think. At the peak of a political debate there are not
always public opinion polls or other scientific studies available that can with certainty say
what the true public opinion is. Not only is there a risk of people observing a skewed
view of public opinion but additionally there is an disproportional distribution of people
who are active during the time of the debate. Some states are clearly overrepresented and
others are underrepresented.
The fact that people mobilise around an issue of abortion in the USA is not completely
surprising. During the Planned Parenthood vs. Casey case there is a similar trend of a
temporary increase in the number of people who thinks abortions should be legal under
any circumstances. The abortion debate in the USA is in general prone to mobilisation
because it is heavily polarised and additionally a sensitive topic, likely to evoke strong
emotions with people. Hence, mobilisation might not only be observed in outlets were
people can express their opinion voluntarily, but also in public opinion polls. This how-
ever needs to be further researched. Since this study finds that public opinion did not
shift, theory indicates that the general public do not on average disagree with the pol-
icy changes. What this means for the future of American abortion policies is that other
states might consider enforcing the same restrictive policies and that Roe v. Wade can
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possibly be overturned. As long as the majority of the public appears to agree and public
opinion does not change to counterbalance the new policies, politicians have an incentive
to continue to enforce them.
In conclusion, when people can choose themselves whether or not they want to convey
their opinion on an issue it can appear as if there has been a shift in public opinion when
it is in fact a change of expression. If this is not kept in mind when considering sentiment
on social media at a time when a debate is at its most intense, there is a risk of politicians,
policymakers and other authorities incorrectly interpreting a mobilisation as a changed
public opinion. If this false perception is acted on, policies might be enforced that are
not in line with what the people wish for and desire. This in turn risks an increased
discontent in society and can in the worst case undermine the democratic system.
Future research should look closer at who the people that mobilised are. With a data set
that provides more demographic information on each individual it would be possible to
dig deeper into the question of who writes on Twitter which could provide a better under-
standing of the mobilisation effect which is observed. Additionally, future research should
investigate if these results are applicable to other channels of information were people
state their opinion voluntarily. Social medial and Twitter is an outlet where anyone with
an internet connection and a computer or phone can write what they think. It provides
a bottom-up perspective of public opinion. Other channels, such as newspaper articles or
televised debates offers a different perspective which is more top-down. Not everyone can
publish an article in a renowned newspaper or take part in televised debates. The people
who do these things are usually influential people such as experts, politicians or people
with special insight or knowledge. Are these outlets also prone to mobilisation effects or
do they more accurately portray the true public opinion in society?
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A Appendix
Descriptive statistics
State N n Party
Mean
sentiment
Mean
sentiment
Jan - May
Mean
sentiment
May - Sep
Sentiment
difference
Total 32059 27617 Rep 0.266 0.271 0.264 -0.007
Alabama 912 822 Rep 0.258 0.231 0.276 0.045
Alaska 11 11 Rep 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Arizona 1674 1410 Rep 0.217 0.188 0.230 0.042
Arkansas 497 417 Rep 0.134 0.134 0.134 0.001
California 1112 962 Dem 0.291 0.263 0.303 0.040
Colorado 1058 920 Dem 0.165 0.248 0.136 -0.112
Connecticut 372 325 Dem 0.222 0.248 0.208 -0.040
Delaware 252 218 Dem 0.289 0.355 0.263 -0.092
Florida 240 211 Rep 0.374 0.376 0.373 -0.003
Georgia 1780 1534 Rep 0.349 0.463 0.300 -0.163
Hawaii 402 369 Dem 0.176 0.024 0.253 0.229
Idaho 261 239 Rep 0.368 0.372 0.366 -0.005
Illinois 558 498 Dem 0.279 0.259 0.290 0.031
Indiana 1540 1331 Rep 0.181 0.090 0.227 0.137
Iowa 476 408 Rep 0.267 0.337 0.245 -0.092
Kansas 374 302 Rep 0.205 0.126 0.242 0.115
Kentucky 127 96 Rep 0.094 0.205 0.000 -0.205
Louisiana 1080 913 Rep 0.286 0.278 0.288 0.011
Maine 122 115 Dem 0.504 0.447 0.544 0.097
Maryland 1050 877 Dem 0.368 0.381 0.363 -0.017
Massachusetts 1125 961 Dem 0.385 0.365 0.397 0.032
Michigan 450 376 Rep 0.003 0.079 -0.031 -0.109
Minnesota 874 766 Dem 0.351 0.374 0.340 -0.034
Mississippi 399 331 Rep 0.208 0.283 0.173 -0.110
Missouri 695 560 Rep 0.211 0.146 0.236 0.091
Montana 44 37 Rep 0.135 0.059 0.200 0.141
Nebraska 408 361 Rep 0.285 0.322 0.267 -0.056
Nevada 281 251 Dem 0.402 0.413 0.395 -0.019
New Hampshire 451 390 Dem 0.238 0.225 0.245 0.020
New Jersey 1533 1330 Dem 0.283 0.305 0.273 -0.033
New Mexico 391 312 Dem 0.247 0.245 0.248 0.003
New York 225 193 Dem 0.202 -0.033 0.311 0.343
North Carolina 812 697 Rep 0.346 0.300 0.373 0.073
North Dakota 118 111 Rep -0.063 0.000 -0.099 -0.099
Ohio 1969 1699 Rep 0.311 0.353 0.280 -0.073
Oklahoma 552 475 Rep 0.185 0.222 0.169 -0.053
Oregon 982 844 Dem 0.378 0.372 0.382 0.010
Pennsylvania 248 217 Rep 0.111 -0.154 0.259 0.413
Rhode Island 758 682 Dem 0.199 0.116 0.238 0.122
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South Carolina 786 642 Rep 0.212 0.296 0.197 -0.099
South Dakota 54 48 Rep 0.125 0.000 0.316 0.316
Tennessee 1532 1319 Rep 0.122 0.119 0.123 0.004
Texas 1368 1189 Rep 0.315 0.299 0.325 0.026
Utah 594 544 Rep 0.259 0.345 0.227 -0.117
Vermont 113 106 Dem 0.406 0.443 0.356 -0.087
Virginia 300 264 Dem 0,420 0,465 0,394 -0.071
Washington 579 459 Dem 0.366 0.290 0.410 0.120
West Virginia 146 138 Rep 0.130 0.229 0.078 -0.151
Wisconsin 118 98 Rep 0.204 0.167 0.221 0.054
Wyoming 256 239 Rep 0.515 0.495 0.531 0.035
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